In and Out of Mind: 
Wittgenstein and Gödel, Post and Turing
Juliet Floyd, Boston University
For Institut Wiener Kreis Vienna Lecture, 7/2019

Abstract

While I say thoughts are in my head, everything’s all right; it becomes harmful when we say thoughts aren’t in my head, they’re in my mind.

Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Remarks* (1930) §230

Models of mind entered and exited the foundations of logic and mathematics in the twentieth century, tossed and shaped by the seas of truth, completeness, incompleteness, and undecidability. From Russell’s 1910 theory of truth in *Principia Mathematica* to Gödel’s infinitary version of it in 1944, claims about the nature of mind and infinity inserted themselves directly into philosophers’ debates over truth.

We shall compare and contrast Wittgenstein, Gödel, Post and Turing on what classical limitative results about logic and the foundations of mathematics do and do not show us about “the mind”. We shall also discuss the very idea of “post-human” AI in relation to these themes and the Vienna Circle’s legacy of scientific humanism.